An entanglement witness approach to quantum coherent state key distribution and a system for its practical implementation are described. The effects of loss and eavesdropping on entanglement and system operation are evaluated as a function of distance. In particular, explicit expressions are given for the distance at which entanglement is entirely lost (entanglement sudden death) due to amplitude reduction and increased variance resulting from ordinary transmission loss and from possible eavesdropping activity. Any eavesdropping is detected by the resulting premature entanglement sudden death, as indicated by the observed value of the entanglement witness.
An entanglement witness approach to quantum coherent state key distribution and a system for its practical implementation are described. The effects of loss and eavesdropping on entanglement and system operation are evaluated as a function of distance. In particular, explicit expressions are given for the distance at which entanglement is entirely lost (entanglement sudden death) due to amplitude reduction and increased variance resulting from ordinary transmission loss and from possible eavesdropping activity. Any eavesdropping is detected by the resulting premature entanglement sudden death, as indicated by the observed value of the entanglement witness. Introduction. The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is for two participants (Alice and Bob) to generate a shared cryptographic key of bits in such a way that quantum mechanics prevents an eavesdropper (Eve) from obtaining significant information about the key undetected. QKD schemes [1, 2] based on exchange of single photons or entangled photon pairs tend to be highly secure [3] . However, because single photons can be easily absorbed or deflected, the operational distances and key generation rates of these schemes are limited. It is more desirable to use pairs of entangled coherent states because individual-photon-level losses have little effect on them. Along with this benefit comes the challenge of detecting eavesdropping, because it suffices for Eve to obtain a small fraction of the coherent state beam to measure the transmitted state. Moreover, although pairs of entangled coherent states can be created [4, 5] , randomly modulating them as needed for QKD is a nontrivial task.
Recently [6] , a QKD method was proposed that involves phase entangling two beams in coherent states by interaction with a single photon that induce phase shifts inside nonlinear media. In that scheme, a beam splitter first puts a photon into a superposition of two possible paths. Each path then induces a phase shift in one of the beams, so that the pair of beams becomes phaseentangled. Alice and Bob each receive one beam and make homodyne measurements to determine its phase. The relative phase between the beams determines the bit value to be used in the key. Eavesdropping is made detectable by introducing additional interferometers with controllable phase shifts σ 1 and σ 2 just before each of the detectors, respectively. Interference terms then appear in the joint detection rate as σ 1 and σ 2 are varied. If the beams have not been disturbed in transit, the visibility of this interference should be greater than
≈ 70.7%, suggesting stronger-than-classical correlations and violation of a Bell-type inequality. If the visibility drops below 70.7%, this is taken to indicate that Eve has tampered with the beam. This method in principle allows phaseentangled states to be robustly distributed over large distances.
In this paper, we propose a different scheme, which introduces entanglement in a manner similar to [6] but uses a fundamentally different approach to eavesdropper detection. This scheme uses a coherent-state entanglement witness [7, 8] and the observation of entanglement sudden death (ESD) [9] , rather than measurements of nonlocal interference associated with a Bell-type inequality, providing substantial benefits described below. To our knowledge, this is the first time such an entanglement witnesses or ESD has been used for QKD.
Phase-Entangled Coherent States. The apparatus for the proposed key distribution scheme is shown in Fig. 1 . A laser followed by a beam splitter produces a pair of coherent states each in state |α . As in [6] , the coherent state subsystem pair initially produced in state |α A |α B becomes entangled in an interferometer by coupling to a single photon. A beam splitter first causes the photon state to enter a superposition of two path eigenstates. Then if the photon is in the upper path state, beam B gains a phase shift 2φ due to cross-phase modulation of the photon with that beam in a nonlinear Kerr medium [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , whereas if the photon is in the lower path state, then there is a phase shift of 2φ of beam A. Finally, by adding a constant φ phase shift to both beams, we can then arrange the output to be in the entangled state
where |N | Note that, whereas ±φ are the phase shifts of the coherent states, θ is the relative phase between the two path states of the photon. The value of joint phase θ can be controlled by the experimenters: Keeping only events in which the photon is detected at D 1 leads to θ = π, while events in which it exits at D 2 lead to θ = 0. (Other values of θ can be achieved if desired by, for example, putting a piece of glass in one of the potential single photon paths.) If the interferometer lacks stability, randomlyvarying phases in the single-photon paths could lead to decoherence. But these photons could be kept on a single bench in Alice's lab and be well-controlled to prevent this. Fluctuations in the phases of the coherent states |α ± A |α ∓ B → |α ± e iδφ1(t) A |α ∓ e iδφ2(t) B would be a more serious problem because these are shared between labs that may be widely separated. This random phase variation is an independent source of entanglement loss, separate from the entanglement loss due to amplitude decay. (We focus here on the latter, leaving the former to be discussed elsewhere.)
Using homodyne detection, each participant can measure the phase of his or her beam to determine the sign of its shift. Because the shifts in the two beams are always opposite, this is sufficient for Alice and Bob to obtain common key bits; for example, if Alice has +φ and Bob has −φ, they can take the common bit value to be 0, while the opposite case then corresponds to 1.
Unfortunately, an eavesdropper may extract part of the beam and determine the bit transmitted. Although this cannot be prevented, it can be detected, so that Alice and Bob can prevent key material from being compromised. Recall that, for the purpose of revealing Eve's intervention, the proposal of [6] is to include two additional interferometers, each coupling one beam to another photon in order to detect nonlocal interference for Bell inequality tests. That approach has at least two limitations: (i) On the theoretical side, detecting Eve only requires entanglement, which in practice may still exist even when the Bell inequality is not violated [16] ; thus, the setup tests for a less than ideal property. (ii) On the experimental side, simultaneous single-photon events are needed in three independent interferometers. This low-probability triple-coincidence in widely-separated interferometers is a significant practical limitation. The method given in the present paper avoids both of these problems by avoiding the need for more than one interferometer altogether.
Entanglement Witness Approach. An entanglement witness is a quantity which is negative whenever a system is entangled; in general, when it is non-negative, nothing can be said about the entanglement or separability of the system. However, the specific witness W we will consider here is a particularly strong one, in the sense that its negativity provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for entanglement when applied to Gaussian states, including coherent states.
The witness W [17] is based on the positive partial trace criterion [18, 19] . Letq 1 ,p 1 be any pair of orthogonal quadratures for beam A andq 2 ,p 2 be corresponding quadratures for B. Form the vector:η = (q 1 ,p 1 ,q 2 ,p 2 ) . The covariance matrix V is defined as the 4 × 4 matrix with elements V ij = 1 2 {η i − η i ,η j − η j } , where {.. , .. } denotes the anticommutator and angular brackets denote expectation value. V can be expressed in terms of three 2 × 2 matrices as V =
and A 2 are the self-covariance matrices of each beam separately; C describes correlations between the A i . An entanglement witness derived from the covariance matrix is then defined [17] as
For coherent states, the system is entangled if and only if W < 0. Using a witness derived from the covariance matrix, as W is, has distinct advantages. V is experimentally measurable: Alice and Bob simply make quadrature measurements and compare them. In addition, losses can be easily incorporated: annihilation operators are attenuated according toâ j → t jâj + 1 − t 2 jâ (E) j (where E denotes the vacuum or environment), so that if the relevant states are orthogonal then the covariance submatrices are affected according to [17] : C → C ′ = t 1 t 2 C, and
I, where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix. In the present case, the coherent states, being of finite intensity, are not orthogonal, so these expressions involve an approximation; they differ from the exact expressions only by exponentially small terms, which are negligible for beams of large amplitude such as considered here. (The factors of 1 4 relative to those in [17] result from a difference in normalization used.) For propagation losses, the transmission matrices are of form t j = e − 1 2 Kj dj , with propagation distance d j in each arm. These expressions can be used to determine the distances over which W can become non-negative, indicating disentanglement.
Assuming loss rates K 1 and K 2 in each arm, then:
with j = 1, 2. The quantities a, b, and c are the values of a ′ , b ′ , and c ′ at zero distance:
where f (θ, φ) = 1 + cos 2φ cos θe 
If Alice generates the state in her lab then d 1 ≈ 0, so
+2bc
As can be seen from Fig. 2 , W starts with large negative values at d 2 = 0 and its magnitude decays rapidly with distance due to propagations losses. Close inspection shows that W crosses from negative to positive values (see unit scale inset) indicating disentanglement at finite distances [9, 20, 21] .
The exponential terms in f and g decay rapidly with increasing |α|. Suppose φ is small enough to approximate 2 drops to .05 for |αφ| > .95 and to .01 for |αφ| > 1.08. Clearly neglecting these terms is safe for |αφ| well above 1, in which case we find that a = Entanglement Death Thresholds. Entanglement sudden death (ESD) is the sudden loss of entanglement in finite time-corresponding here to finite distancein contrast to the more common asymptotic loss of entanglement due to decoherence [9, 20, 21] . Consider φ = 0 and symmetric losses,
For φ = 0 the state is unentangled, so we would expect W > 0 at all distances. The matrix elements reduce to a = α sin φ for symmetric decay. For the case of decay in only one arm, ESD occurs at d 2 equal to twice this distance. These results are plotted in Fig. 3 for |α sin φ| = 10. Note that, for fixed α, the ESD distance is largest at φ = π 2 , i.e. when the entangled states are |α and | − α . As the distance formula makes clear, ESD can always be made to occur at any distance desired by choosing appropriate values of φ and α.
Eavesdropping and noise. Let us now consider the effect of eavesdropping, beginning with the effect of measurement on the quadratures. Letq andp be any pair of conjugate quadratures, such as amplitude and phase quadratures. Suppose an experimenter makes simultaneous measurements of both quadratures and that his or her measuring apparatus has amplitude gains G q , G p and random noiseζ q (t),ζ p (t) for the two measurements. Let us assume all noise terms introduced both here and below are of zero mean ζ q = ζ p = 0 and uncorrelated with each other and with the quadratures, qζ i = pζ i for i ∈ {q, p}. What the detectors actually measure [24, 25] are the quantitiesX = G+ζ q and The larger distance of disentanglement for the asymmetric case is due the fact that the two coherent states move apart in phase space, whereas in the symmetric case both decay toward the same vacuum state. Y = G pp +ζ p . The variances for the quadratures are then
Suppose Eve inserts two beam splitters in order to extract part of the beam, measures it, and then reinserts it (masking the amplitude drop). Assume that the two beam splitters have the same amplitude reflection and transmission coefficients, r and t (with |r| 2 + |t| 2 = 1, t real, and r = i|r|). Eve can measure either quadrature, or both, introducing amplitude gain G Ej and random noise functionζ Ej . j labels the quadrature j ∈ {q, p}. The first beam splitter adds vacuum noiseζ BS,j to each quadrature, with ζ BS,j = 0 and ζ Let the initial quadratures be q 1 , p 1 for Alice's branch and q 2 , p 2 for Bob's, with the corresponding final detected signalsX A ,Ŷ A andX B ,Ŷ B . Assuming eavesdropping only on Bob's side, we then find
X B = G B2 + ξ qζBS,q + rζ Eq +ζ Bq (14)
where γ j = t 2 + r 2 G Ej and ξ j = rt(G Ej + 1). Thus the X, Y covariance matrix submatrices are
Note that A 1 and A 2 need not be equal, due to the independence of the noise terms and of the gains in the two branches, and that eavesdropping can occur only in Bob's branch. The cross-correlation C is independent of noise terms because the noise in one detector is uncorrelated with noise in the other. Eve can be seen through her detector noise terms in Bob's self-correlation matrix A 2 and the coefficients γ q , γ p , ξ q , and ξ p . For the simplest nontrivial distance dependence (symmetric loss, W is plotted versus distance in Fig. 4 for various levels of eavesdropping for the case where all gains are equal to unity and detector noise is negligible. The effect of eavesdropping is apparent: As the beam fraction |r| 2 extracted by Eve increases, the decay rate of |W| increases, and the ESD distance drops significantly. Quantitatively, for symmetric decay, unit gain, and negligible noise, the distance at which ESD is lost is now given by
, with the influence of eavesdropping being most evident in the reduction of distance resulting from the parameter ξ q , which measures the portion of the beam that Eve's measurement couples to the vacuum at her beam splitter. Conclusions. We have analyzed effects of loss and eavesdropping in a system intended to robustly distribute entangled coherent states over long distances for quantum keys distribution. We have demonstrated that when combined with the entanglement-witness approach, the system can detect eavesdropping over distances on the order of hundreds of kilometers. 2 of the beam intensity stolen by Eve increases |W| decays faster. The curves correspond to r = 0 (solid red), r = .2 (dashed green), and r = .4 (dotted black). As seen in the inset, as |r| 2 increases W changes sign at correspondingly shorter distances. Here αφ = 10 and θ = 0. This premature loss of entanglement can signal that Eve is acting.
Besides differing conceptually from all previous QKD approaches, our results for coherent-state QKD based on the use of an entanglement witness and ESD for eavesdropping detection offers distinct advantages over use of a Bell-type inequality for that purpose. In particular, comparing the above results with those in [6] , we see that ESD always occurs at much larger distances than the loss of Bell non-locality. Hence, W is available for eavesdropping detection over larger distances than is the Bell-type inequality of the proposal on [6] , extending the range of distances in which the phase-entangled coherent states are known to be useful for QKD. Moreover, the entanglement witness method requires only a single trigger photon, rather than the triple-coincidence trigger required for testing the Bell-type inequality, a substantial practical improvement.
